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With the title I’ve been assigned to talk about, task-sharing, I’m looking at the
issue in the context of the title of this section. Also, I’m looking at the issue in the
context of the title of the conference, which is broader in scope. Further on, I’m looking
at task-sharing in the context of overall European security, and not just in the sense of
what the Americans, Spanish, French and others can contribute. In essence, I’ll be
looking at task-sharing in the context of designing a peace and security system for post-
Cold War Europe that is meant to be achievable: a peace and security “architecture” (
to make use of a fashionable word) that is actually coming into place as we speak because
of its making use of existing international governmental and non-governmental actors
to provide for security on the continent.  
The task-sharing that I’m about to share with you involves a model I’ve been
looking at called the “New European Peace and Security System” – “NEPSS”, for short.
And NEPSS has both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Descriptively, as I just
indicated, NEPSS is developing as we speak; but, it also has prescriptive elements,
elements that I think ought to be there for the post-Cold War peace and security system
in the new Europe to prevent what I call “future Yugoslavias”. 
First of all, the descriptive aspects of NEPSS: Here, I’m looking at the post-Cold
War peace and security architecture for Europe in the context of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is the main organizing device for
my model, for the simple reason that it includes all the former Cold War enemies, and
the neutral and unaligned, numbering some 54/55 participating states in all. And, as
you all know, the OSCE (coming from the old CSCE – the Helsinki Process) has three
pillars, three distinguishing dimensions. 
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The first one used to be called “security” back in the old Cold War days; the
second: environmental and economic; and the third, humanitarian and human rights.
Now we view all three “baskets” as aspects of post-Cold War security in the
comprehensive sense. So, basket one in the OSCE is now political-military aspects of
overall security; basket two, economic and environmental aspects, and, basket three,
humanitarian and human rights aspects of overall security. 
What’s important about these three pillars of the OSCE? I think most of us would
agree that we see paradigm shifts taking place in terms of other existing international
governmental organizations in the region, whereby they are moving beyond national
security toward common security. Let’s look at basket one, at the political and military
aspects of overall security. Here we have NATO as the principle actor qualifying for
political-military aspects of overarching security. And as we know, NATO is talking
about increasing its membership to include former members of the former Warsaw
Pact: In July, in Madrid, the Czechs, the Poles, and the Hungarians (these three, at
least) will be asked to become members of the new NATO. And in addition to NATO
as such reaching out to former enemies of the Cold War era, there are two creations
of NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for
Peace (PfP), the latter having among its members most, if not all, of the former Cold
War enemies, plus some of the neutral and unaligned. In terms of analysis, then, at the
level of basket one we have, on the one hand, NATO as such; and, on the other, we
have NATO as NACC and the Partnership for Peace reaching out to former Cold War
enemies to include them in common security organizations. These moves towards
common security are, I think, some example of NEPSS which are presently happening
in basket one of the three-part OSCE structure .
At the level of basket two, we have the European Union clearly also doing the
same thing – reaching out to former Cold War adversaries. In fact, the former Cold
War enemies are quite active in looking to get some kind of status within the context
of the EU. Some of them already have associate membership, while some are looking
for full-fledged membership before the 21st century comes upon us. In any case, the
point is that within the context of basket two of the OSCE, the EU is reaching out to
former members of the Warsaw Pact as well.
And under basket three, we have the Council of Europe, which has been leading
the way in many ways to embrace former Cold War enemies. So, very briefly in terms
of the OSCE structure, we have existing institutions taking on board as new members,
or contemplating taking on board as new members, former members of the Warsaw
Pact, which thereby suggests to me that descriptively we have a paradigm shift taking
place in those three dimensions of the OSCE – away from national security in the
narrowly defined realpolitik sense, towards common security in a true post-Cold War
European sense.
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Now, having said all that, there’s still a problem with the greater scenario, even
though empirically these processes are happening. The problem is this: Everything I’ve
talked about thus far is basically inter-state in nature. The OSCE is an inter-state
structure. NATO is basically inter-state, as are its two creations, the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. The EU, although it has trans-
national, supra-state ambitions, is still basically inter-state. And the Council of Europe
is inter-state. So, although these are exciting movements that I’ve talked about (the
getting away from traditional realpolitik-based national security and movement toward
common security), these developments are not by themselves sufficient to prevent
“future Yugoslavias”. 
And by “future Yugoslavias” I mean conflicts, brutal conflicts, involving members
of different ethnic communities, within state structures. All those organizations that
I’ve just mentioned, NATO, NACC, OSCE and so on, are really not geared, nor are
they designed to deal with these kinds of situations. They may talk about it – the OSCE
certainly has; the High Commissioner on National Minorities does have the human
dimension mechanism. Basically, however, the OSCE is still inter-state bound. 
So, the NEPSS model has to go beyond its descriptive components to include
some other dimensions, which brings us to the prescriptive element of NEPSS. And
here, I’m also coming to you as a conflict resolution person and not just as an
international relations or strategic studies person. 
Under the prescriptive part of NEPSS, I have coined an expression called
“integrated systems of conflict resolution networks”. Integrated systems of conflict
resolution networks have two dimensions: the vertical and the horizontal. Under the
vertical dimension of integrated systems, I begin by assuming that all politics is local,
that all conflicts have a local point of origin. Further, I imagine a vertical mapping
of Europe in terms of many villages and cities embedded in societal, national, sub-
regional, regional, and finally, international settings. For instance, in the context of
former Yugoslavia we have Bosnia, wherein we have Srebrenica and Tuzla; next, we
have the national level; further on, there’s the sub-regional level in the Balkans; and,
then we have the regional (European-wide); and, finally, the international level. I
imagine that at each of these levels there’s a combination of governmental actors,
which are known as “track one” agents in the discipline and, corresponding to each
of these governmental actors, there are non-governmental (“track two”) actors which
specialize in humanitarian and conflict resolution kinds of roles. So, for each of these
vertically located levels (local, societal, national, sub-regional, regional, and
international), we have governmental actors, and corresponding to each one of these,
we have non-governmental actors which can complement what state actors and
international governmental actors do, but don’t do enough of. And here let me give
some examples of what I’m talking about:
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Traditionally,  governmental actors deal with negative peace. Negative peace is
not, by itself, bad. It’s not called negative because it’s bad. Negative means the absence
of war; and that’s not bad. I would have loved to have had negative peace in former
Yugoslavia long before Richard Holbrooke and NATO came on the scene to help bring
about negative peace, which is still holding. But negative peace, as the absence of war
(although good in and of itself), does not lead automatically to dealing with the
underlining causes and conditions of the conflict that has become waged through violent
means. At some point in time negative peace has to be followed by positive peace. And
positive peace deals with those underlining causes and conditions, which is not just
about putting out the fire (the metaphor we often hear in track one governmental
domains). Diplomats often say, “We have to put the fire out. I’m so busy putting fires out
that I don’t have time to do anything else. What, deal with the underlining causes?”. Well,
if all we do is deal with negative peace –which, again, in and of itself, can save lives–
we may end up having a Cyprus-type situation. 
But, as we’ve seen in the last couple of days in Cyprus, if all we have is a green
line, manned and womaned by United Nations’ troops, and thousands of Turkish
forces in the northern part, we stop the fighting, we freeze in place the forces, but we
do not deal with the underlining causes and conditions –which means that the violence,
the fire in the house can flare up again at any point in time.
In the vertical part of integrated systems of NEPSS, track two non-governmental
actors are meant to bring in a positive peace complement to the track one negative
peace expertise of state actors and international governmental actors. They are meant
to work together with governmental actors at each level: local, societal, national, sub-
regional, regional, and international. 
Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. At the level of Sarajevo, or
Tuzla, or Srebrenica, we have governmental actors fulfilling welfare and law and order
functions. Well, welfare and law and order functions may only go so far with regards
to what the city or the village can provide. There may be, in this case, a need for a non-
governmental actor which can help the state actors at the local level do a bit more of
what they would like to do but lack resources to do. It is in such a case as this that
track two non-governmental actors might, in fact, provide conflict-resolution expertise
which track one governmental actors may not have.
To give you a personal example, I’m a former police officer and a former American
marine: I’ve been trained to do lots of realpolitik, negative peacemaking, and negative
peace maintenance. Never during my time as a police officer or as a marine was I trained
to deal with the underlining causes and conditions of conflict. Now, you might say “that
was not your job”; I accept that. That was not my job. However, a lot of the conflicts
that the police get called upon to deal with, and that the Marines, Navy, Air Force and
diplomats get called upon to deal with might have been dealt with years   before the
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house (if you will) had ever caught on fire to begin with. So that’s why (as envisaged
under the vertical dimension of the integrated systems) track two non-governmental
actors ought to be in a position to help track one actors at each of those vertical levels. 
Now, very briefly, the horizontal dimension. For positive peace conflict resolution
to work, it has to have the involvement of all parties. After all, it is quite conceivable
that one of the actors may wish to continue prosecuting (even!) a genocidal, ethnic-
cleansing policy against another actor, in which case the vertical design may not work. 
Also keep in mind that the vertical design is meant to be very practical: It’s meant
to implement Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s idea of preventative diplomacy. If, at the local
level something potentially dangerous is happening, it would be very important to get to
that situation at that point in time using track two non-governmental as well as track one
governmental actors for a variety of reasons: one, to stop the fire before it gets worse; and
two, not only to stop the fire before it spreads to include others in other neighborhoods,
but also to keep the costs for all concerned as low as possible. That intent may not work.
The fire may spread, in which case the horizontal dimension must kick in.
Here, I think, I disappoint some of my conflict resolution colleagues by saying if,
in fact, one of the major actors in a conflict situation wishes to continue to prosecute
genocidal, ethnic-cleansing policies against other actors, then it becomes imperative
for the international community to use a little bit of realpolitik-based force, but as part
of a larger idealpolitik-based positive peace conflict resolution strategy to bring about
negative peace, to forcibly stop the fire, to forcibly separate the parties, and then to let
the dust settle in order for more positive peace mechanisms, actors and processes to
come in to the situation and encourage the parties to deal non-violently with the
underlining causes and conditions of the conflicts which have turned violent. 
So, to conclude, this has been an outline of NEPSS and of the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of its integrated systems of conflict resolution networks. It is a
lot of information in a short period of time, but I’ll be more than happy to take any
questions about it. 
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